The Age of Oversharing Essay Example for Free

The Age of Oversharing Essay â€Å"My battery in my phone is dying† or â€Å"Oh, he can tweet but can’t text back? † is what floods Twitter user’s timeline on a daily basis. Meghan Daum refers to this as the Age of Oversharing in her essay â€Å"I Don’t Give a Tweet What You’re Doing,† where she sarcastically dissects the controversies behind Twitter and how nearly fourteen million users have completely abandoned Twitter’s â€Å"initial function to serve as an information conduit between close friends and family† (233). Along with her beliefs of Twitter adding to our already compromised interpersonal skills she carries the tone of being bitter and harsh throughout her essay as she evaluates the many answers to the question â€Å"what are you doing? † with a better question â€Å"what the hell are we doing? † Although Twitter serves to connect others instantly it ceases human interaction almost instantly as well. We live in a world where everything around us is done almost instantly and more conveniently. Prime examples, fast food restaurants, self-serve salad bars, fast thirty day weight lost results and JG Wentworth’s â€Å"it’s my money and I need it now! We expect everything around us to move at a fast pace and that is exactly what is happening on Twitter, what you ate for breakfast, what article you read during lunch and your favorite show you watch every night before bed is now being shared with the world instantly with the click of a button. Daum refers to this as the Age of Oversharing, consecutive irrelevant post right after another which completely defeats the purpose of solely connecting with love ones not only because of geographical dispersions but also the reality of daily work and school commitments. Researchers at Harvard came up with studies that explain how Twitter has contributed to the Age of Oversharing and that is because nearly eighty percent of tweets on Twitter are of one’s own immediate experiences. This is because â€Å"researchers found that the act of disclosing information about oneself activates the same sensation of pleasure in the brain that we get from eating food, getting money or having sex† (Susan 2). That explains why every time I check my timeline someone either is willingly announcing that they are on the bus this morning for work or what kind of cereal that had this morning . I admit I am guilty of also tweeting about the day I just had or how I cannot wait for class to be over so I can watch Basketball Wives later that night on VH1. Our constant tweets reveal to our followers what we are truly about. Twitter can be obnoxious at times, constantly viewing irrelevant tweets from your followers on a daily basis. Daum takes the time to evaluate Twitter as if it were a person, stating that Twitter would be â€Å"an emotionally unstable person†¦that person we avoid at parties† (233). She goes further to add that Twitter will be the person we would view as mentally ill and will eventually feel sorry for. Her tone here towards Twitter is depicted as being fed up with users disclosed thoughts of one’s self. Daum examines these tweets as unstable and this is apparent because if you take away the whole purpose and backbone of Twitter, it is just mostly users microblogging their every move and thought. Looking at the bigger picture this is when â€Å"I don’t give a tweet what you’re doing† becomes notable. It is true that we all have that one friend that constantly rambles about something either random or irrelevant. My friend Bobby is that friend that mirrors Daum’s reflection of Twitter as a person. For instance, Bobby is always looking for attention and if no one is giving it to her she splats out something pointless just like most Twitter users do. I would rather not answer her phone calls because she can go on about herself and drift off upon pointless conversations becoming â€Å"the tragic oversharer† we would all like to avoid. Today since gestures like a wave hello or a polite smile are now being used more openly than before in emoticons through social networks, face to face interaction between people has now diminished. Daum asks the question of, are we tweeting because we truly want to communicate with a select group of true friends, or because typing has replaced talking? Being that free thoughts and videos are now instantly streaming to friends and family over Twitter, there leaves little room for story telling of a series of unfortunate events that can fit in a 140 character text box. It seems many prefer typing over talking, this can also explain the oversharing on social networks. Daum argues that we have misused Twitter for what it is really worth; instead of spoken words they are typed. I see this in my best friend Stephanie’s family where favors and questions for each other are preferred typed. Just last week I was over, Stephanie’s older brother sent her a tweet asking her â€Å"where is the remote? † Spoken communication becomes absent as connecting online becomes apparent more and more. Collectively, more ideas are being typed instead of spoken and excessive feelings are being squeezed into emoticons rather than expressed in person. In â€Å"I Don’t Give a Tweet What You’re Doing† Daum argues that this generation has entered the Age of Oversharing and has left the age of the telephone. Obnoxious and pointless tweets fed our ego’s.

Centralia No. 5 Essay Example for Free

Centralia No. 5 Essay The obvious problem with Centralia No. 5 is that an explosion killed 111 people. However, prior to the actual explosion, the problem is less obvious, especially since Centralia No. 5 was similar to so many mines that did not explode. In this analysis, I will examine the possible roles and responsibilities of Driscoll O. Scanlan, the mine inspector, given the corruption of modern administrative enterprises prior to the accident. From this perspective, the perspective of a public official in the field, the problem is that a potential danger exists and the regulatory machinery in place to address the danger is ineffective. As an expert, Scanlan recommended that the mine be dusted with non-explosive, pulverized stone to diminish the possibility of the coal dusts exploding. However, his expert advice alone was not enough to motivate a response. History The chronology of the case shows a progression of appropriate action within the existing law and according to organization or bureaucratic norms. On an organiza ¬tional level, the players include the State of Illinois, the U.S. Government, the Centralia Coal Company, the United Mine Workers of America, and the miners themselves, who could hardly be said to have been well represented by any of the others. Beginning in 1941, Scanlans reports of excessive coal dust in the Centralia No. 5 mine were sent to Robert Medill, the Director of the Department of Mines and Minerals, and handled as routine by Robert Weir, the Assistant to the Director. All three positions were appointed by the Governor, Dwight H. Green. Also in 1941, the U.S. Bureau of Mines began making inspections of mines. The first inspection of Centralia No. 5 was in September 1942. However, only the State of Illinois had any power to enforce compliance, and reports from the Bureau there ¬fore had primary significance as further documentation in the hands of the Department of Mines and Minerals and the Governor. Scanlans reports were forwarded to the Centralia Coal Company, owned by Bell Zoller, with a letter requesting that the Company comply with the inspectors recommendations. Needless to say, the Coal Company did not comply, which is predictable given the lack of any attempt to enforce the requests and the high demand during the war. The mine workers eventually began working  through Local Union No. 52, led by William Rowekamp, recording secretary. Throughout the course of events, the mine workers sent correspondence to the State of Illinois, at first to Medill and then directly to the Governor. The letters consistently and emphatically requested attention to the danger present in the mine as documented by Scanlans extensive reports. The seriousness of the situation seemed to fade within the bureaucratic and political routine within the Department of Mines and Minerals. Alternatives Scanlan was faced with several logistical alternatives, but the motivations behind action were of two sorts. As I said before, all of the players followed paths of appropriate action within the existing law and according to organizational or bureaucratic norms. The only exception, perhaps, was the Centralia Coal Company. But the coal company clearly recognized a difference between a routine infraction and a serious infraction, at least as it concerned the correspondence from the Department of Mines and Minerals, and they had no indication that Scanlans reports on Centralia No. 5 were anything unusual. Scanlans performance was no exception. He did precisely what was required of him by his position. Even the Department itself complied with the letter of the law. Because the Director of the Department of Mines and Minerals has some discretion, it is not a requirement of law that every technically enforceable infraction actually be enforced. This is a matter of judgment. Scanlan was clearly motivated by attention to law and bureaucratic norms, but he was also pulled by an obvious obligation to the public welfare, in this case the miners lives at Centralia No. 5. The problem confronting Scanlan was not so much a moral conflict as the need to recognize that compliance with his designated role was inadequate as a response, both as public official and as expert, to the greater responsibility to the public. And because Scanlans reports were extensive and thorough, including every infraction, he had a responsibility to make sure that the decision makers understood the gravity of the danger, perhaps by highlighting the more serious problems. However, given that the system failed to recognize the danger, there were two possible paths of action: (1) work within the system, possibly in ways beyond the designated role of mine inspector; or (2) work outside the system and mobilize public concern, through the union or otherwise. There is a sense in which staying  within the system would preserve Scanlans conformity with legal and organizational norms while still addressing the public welfare. However, there is ample evidence that the organizational players would be unresponsive or at least politically difficult. Solution I think that Scanlan could have effected a response within the system, although he would certainly have had to abandon a passive stance. First, the obligation to the general welfare clearly trumps any mere compliance with organizational norms and in this case the spirit of the law, never mind the letter of the law, is in the name of such general welfare. Second, the role of mine inspectors is to police the mine operators. This could be construed as a responsibility to report infractions and leave enforcement to the Director of the Department. However, because the Director allows his subordinates to handle so much of the routine, it seems reasonable to expect the inspectors to handle cases like Centralia No. 5 more pro-actively. Third, there is a responsibility left on Scanlans shoulders as an expert and a professional. His technical expertise allows him to distinguish apparent and real dangers. And because his role in the field puts him in close proximity to the mines, he is perhaps the only individual with such responsibility in a situation where serious problems are apparent. Costs/Benefits The costs for Scanlan are evident. Because his position is a political patronage job, any aggressive pursuit of his responsibilities runs the risk of getting him removed from his position. Of course, this is as much a matter of how one negotiates the political terrain as of what one is trying to accomplish. I have no doubt that interesting correspondence, emphasizing the prudence of avoiding deaths in the mines, could have been sent to Governor Green, with the assistance and political experience of the Director of the Department of Mines and Minerals, of course. Even if Scanlan loses his job, the clear benefits are 111 lives. There are hidden benefits as well, though. By generating a relationship with the Director and the Governor, Scanlan is creating a mechanism for handling this sort of issue—a sort of policy formation from below. Given that Centralia No. 5 appears no  different from the other mines, this may be the more pressing issue anyway.

The Resource Based View Of Wal Mart Management Essay

The Resource Based View Of Wal Mart Management Essay The broad marketing environment of an organisation consists of the intra-organisational interactions amongst its internal factors, as also the external, diverse and inter-related environmental factors that are referred to as the external macro-environment (Lancaster Reynolds, 2001). Michael Porters diamond model states that whilst criteria like location, land, labour and magnitude of local population are conventionally considered to be influential in shaping competitive advantage, the real competitive national advantages are obtained by factors like strategy, organisational structure, business rivalries and competition, and related ancillary industries (Proctor, 2002). Hofstede, in his study of international cultures found that cultures comprise of rituals, values, symbols and heroes and that the bedrock of cultural differences between organisational culture flowed from five dimensions of national culture, (Hofstede, 2001), namely (a) power distance, (b) Uncertainty avoidance, (c) individualism, (d) long-term orientation and (e) masculinity (Vinken, Soeters, Ester, 2004). The larger macro environment, widely referred to as the PESTEL analytical framework, concerns political, economic, societal, technological, environmental and legal factors, whose analysis helps in scrutinising and pinpointing the influence of such environmental forces on organisations (Gray, 1999, P 12). Ritzer (1996) concludes that whilst remonstrating and opposing McDonaldisation is potentially worthwhile, the future of added McDonaldisation appears inevitable (Alfino, Caputo, Wynyard, 1998). The resource-based view (RBV) centres into intra-industry heterogenic organisations and contends that firms are distinctive packets of resources and capabilities providing the foundation for gaining competitive advantages; it conveys that organisations should leverage these self-owned resources even in unstructured international markets (Fahy, 1996). The RBV states that competitive advantage from resources can be achieved only if such resources are precious and enable the exploitation of an external opportunity or the counteracting of a threat (Fahy, 1996). Another critical characteristic of resource is rarity, which is inherently the key to heterogeneity, i.e. competitors should not have or be able to access similar resources rendering competitive advantages (Fahy, 1996). The critical condition of imperfect or limited mobility of resource must be further satisfied; imperfect resources that render competitive advantages must not be tradable amongst competitors (Fahy, 1996). Finally, the resource should be imperfectly imitable (Barney, 1991) or as per Peteraf (1993), render several ex-post restrictions to the opposition (Fahy, 1996). Stalk, Evans and Schulman (1992) aver that Wal-Marts growth, leading to its market supremacy, vests in its unique logistics competencies, which underline the magnitude of capabilities as latent causes of competitive advantage; their cross-docking coordination system makes certain that merchandise between two loading docks is transported in not more than forty eight hours (Fahy, 1996). This has benefited Wal-Mart not only in cutting cost of sales, and thereby improving margins, by 2 to 3 percent, but also in minimising the inventory levels (Fahy, 1996), working capital cycle and interest costs. The above system is therefore, seen to be immensely beneficial in value generation through cost reduction and thereby in being a source of competitive advantage; since it satisfies all requisite criteria (Fahy, 1996). The cross-docking system is rare. As it is resource based in terms of the joint utilisation of personnel, delivery vehicles and transportation and communication systems, it satisfies the condition of imperfect mobility (Fahy, 1996). It is also enormously complicated and thus difficult for competitors to reproduce, vis-a-vis the requisite coordination and communication between vendors, distribution centres, sales depots and outlets; it is this intrinsic ability to raise high barriers to imitation that bestows Wal-Mart with competitive advantage (Fahy, 1996). The advanced management methodologies underlined by the current advances in technology now permit the availability of customised merchandise on mass scales; such mass customisation arises from the juxtaposition of dual Japanese systems of flexible manufacturing, or lean production system, and adaptable marketing systems (Yasumuro, 1993),  (Alfino, Caputo, Wynyard, 1998). Wal-Mart is being able to successfully utilise its resources and competencies in establishing sustained competitive advantage, with appropriate and combined application of Porters Diamond model with PESTEL methodologies and RBV theory, in order to cater to variable, disparate and localised merchandise preferences, desires and needs of their customers. Question 2: In May, 2006, Wal-Mart announced the sale of all its 16 South Korean stores, and shortly thereafter, in July of the same year, the sale of its German operations to Metro A.G.; after eight years of effort to try to make the businesses profitable (Depamphilis, 2009). Unlike its remarkable success in getting it right on its home turf, Wal-Mart could not adapt to the regulatory and cultural differences, as well as the strong labour unions, in Germany (Depamphilis, 2009). The intensity of the German competitors in offering very low price points across product categories and the consumers thrift and prudence was also largely underestimated by the company (Depamphilis, 2009). Various factors like (a) the German shoppers adverse perceptions regarding clerks bagging groceries, (instead of themselves, as per their habitual practice), (b) legal tussles with employees over Wal-Marts policies against employee-supervisor liaisons, (c) the companys inability to proffer extended shopping hours or to sell below cost, (because of German regulations), and (d) its inability to implement cost reductions because of strong unionism, contributed in making the companys German venture a big mistake (Depamphilis, 2009). Wal-Mart forayed into Korea with the acquisition of 4 units, in 1999, from the Metro owned Dutch chain named Macro (Mahajan-Bansal, 2010). Korea is a comparatively established market with the local Emart being the leader in the retail marketplace (Mahajan-Bansal, 2010). Emart was made an acquisition offer by Wal-Mart, which it rejected (Mahajan-Bansal, 2010). The company was also cautioned by Emart that with Korea being a localised market with very specific customer needs and wants, Wal-Marts size and its status as the largest global retailer would not be very relevant in achieving competitive advantage in the Korean marketplace (Mahajan-Bansal, 2010). Wal-Mart entered the market with a bang but could never gain prominence; after seven years it sold its stores (ironically) to Emart and exited the market (Mahajan-Bansal, 2010). In China, on the other hand, the company progressed well. Avoiding major blunders, it has been able to achieve the right mix of localisation of store formats and merchandise mix (Mahajan-Bansal, 2010). Chinas high heterogeneity, with regard to its peoples habits and wants are similar to that of any other developing economy (Mahajan-Bansal, 2010). It has laboured hard to become an esteemed retailer in China, even as it is still too early in the country to realise its full potential (Mahajan-Bansal, 2010). This is important because China and India are at the centre of Wal-Marts global ambitions for Asia (Depamphilis, 2009). Wal-Mart reckons China as a solitary large market, whereas its more successful French competitor Carrefour considers China as a cluster of regional or local markets; Wal-Mart has a centralised sourcing and distribution centre unlike Carrefour (Mahajan-Bansal, 2010). The Chinese prefer to purchase fresh poultry and meat; hence the need for local sourcing to be faster and smarter rather than being centrally sourced (Mahajan-Bansal, 2010). Wal-Mart in China assists local retailer businesses to improve their functioning and service standards in order to integrate better with the local economies (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). Its perseverance in localisation of procurement creates more job opportunities, reposes trust in local producers, and helps in sustaining local economies (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). Wal-Mart treats its Chinese vendors as partners in development. Practically 95% of the goods sold by the company are locally produced by almost 20,000 suppliers (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). Wal-Marts journey in China has been fraught with many challenges, primarily due to the American retailing methodologies followed by the organisation (Gopalkrishnan, 2009). The singular differentiator between Wal-Marts strategies and Carrefours more entrenched adjustment to the Chinese environment lies in it appreciation of and response to local culture and consumer behaviour (Gopalkrishnan, 2009). In China the company possibly needs to understand that heterogeneous Chinese shoppers would possibly be better served by decentralised operations, combined with simultaneous leveraging of its competitive advantages of low prices, quality, and technologically superior logistics (Gopalkrishnan, 2009). Working together with local partners within the regulatory framework and cultural landscape is a critical lesson that appears to have been absorbed and espoused in advancing its Chinese retail footprint (Gopalkrishnan, 2009). Wal-Mart, by exiting the German market, (post the $ 1 billion pre-tax bottom-line hit), and retreating from the Korean marketplace, conveyed to its stakeholders the lessons it learnt on (a) the importance of appreciating cultural and environmental differences in new markets and (b) the need to focus sharply on profitability and returns in its global investment and growth strategy (Workman, D., 2006). Question 3: The widely used PESTEL framework represents an analytical methodology for evaluating the milieu in which individual organisations or industries operate, work and are managed; such an analysis aids in methodically focusing upon and assessing the impact of various environmental forces, namely those that are political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, environmental and legal in nature, upon business organisations or particular industrial segments (Gray, 1999, P 12). The Wal-Mart group scrupulously operates within the political and legal frameworks in all the countries in which it operates; such a strategy can often lead to the emergence of serious challenges, as in Germany where local regulations did not permit the company to extend the weekend hours or to sell below cost (Depamphilis, 2009). The companys expansion into different nations are also dependent on local political conditions and governmental and local regulations, as illustrated by Wal-Marts unsuccessful foray in Indonesia, where it needed the support of Suhartos network to ensure continuance of operations (Mahajan-Bansal, 2010). Apart from such factors organisations have to deal with copious local laws regarding labour and welfare; other trading regulations also affect business operations and need to be complied with, by organisations, their employees and their participating associates. Ecological challenges with regard to environmental protection and use of green production methodologies also need to be diligently targeted above minimum statutory requirements and achieved; Wal-Mart projects itself as a sustainability leader and incorporates participation of all internal and external associates and partners in setting targets for fulfilment of their energy needs (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). Its environmental and green objectives are targeted to be achieved through greater use of renewable sources, encouraging use of environmentally friendly products and working towards zero waste (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). Catastrophic events and fluctuating weather patterns can also challenge operational efficiencies (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). Most global retail players have at one time or another felt the need to factor in challenges relating to country specific general economic conditions, disposable incomes of shoppers, buying patterns and preferences, cost of goods and labour, interest and currency exchange rates, customer debt levels, credit availability and history, fuel and energy prices, insurance costs, et al. (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). Economic challenges, especially in forays into matured markets, include top-line protection, sustained profitability and cash flows; these challenges assume critical proportions, not only due to the intense rivalry and competition in the retail turf, but also due to wafer thin margins and the fairly long gestation period involved in setting up just-in-time inventory and logistics, and best in class infrastructure. The socio-cultural norms of no two nations are alike. This poses immense challenges in conforming to local practices and customs and therefore requires diligent and sustained efforts in satisfying cultural needs; inadequate attention to cultural needs has led to numerous retail failures across the globe; Germany and Korea represent two cases of different cultures that Wal-Mart failed to tackle appropriately (Depamphilis, 2009). Another case in point is the heterogeneous nature of the Chinese population, which mandates local rather than centralised sourcing (Mahajan-Bansal, 2010). Diverse cultural environments prevail even within small countries, on the lines of geographical or other divisions, demanding adherence by business to disparate social and cultural norms. Retail forays into new international marketplaces need implementation of contemporary technology for combating the inherently competitive nature of the industry. Wal-Mart and other major retail players are using RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) technology for product tagging and coding to combat the logistics challenges for procuring, moving, stacking and selling ever increasing volumes and varieties of merchandise across geographies and continents (Stoler, 2006). Additional risks that Wal-Mart could be exposed to in its global businesses could emerge from fiscal and monetary policies and inflation rates of its host countries, political, social and economic instability, adverse tax consequences, and, inter alia, difficulties in enforcing IPRs (Intellectual Property Rights) in non-US countries (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). The mitigation of these challenges and risks essentially lie in diligently adapting to local country-specific and region-specific norms and regulations and in synergising them with proprietary best-in-class expertise in technology and logistics. Such stratagems are required for the progression of glocalisation or transnational objectives and attainment of economic and sustainable growth. Question 4: The management of the Wal-Mart conglomerate employs numerous measures for evaluation of corporate performance, the chief among them being (a) total sales, (b) operating income, (c) comparable store sales, (d) diluted income per share from continuing operations, (e) return on investment and (f) free cash-flow (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). The total sales for the fiscal year ended January 31, 2010, clocked in at $ 401.2 million compared to $ 374.3 million for the previous year, registering a 7.2% growth, following a 8.6% growth in the previous 2008 fiscal (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). Such enhancement in net sales resulted from diverse acquisitions, store sales additions, and the worldwide expansion of business (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). The efficacious management and leveraging of expenses of the company can be measured by operating income, which rose by 3.95 % in fiscal 2009, against an increase of 7.1% in the previous year; this occurrence occurred primarily because of Internationals adverse impact from foreign currency conversion rates, (amounting to $ 2.3 billion) and the Sam Clubs marginal percent decrease, due to increases in operating and overhead expenses (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). Introducing new stores leads necessarily to reduction in sales of existing stores in the vicinity; as per revised capital efficiency computation methodology, the adverse approximate impact on current store sales was 1.1% and 1.5% in fiscals 2009 and 2008 respectively; this impact will abate in future due to intended reduction in opening of new stores (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). The diluted income from continuing businesses increased from $ 3.16 in fiscal 2008 to $ 3.35 per share in fiscal 2009, consequent to income enhancements, combined with repurchase of outstanding quantum of weighted average shares. The corresponding figure for fiscal 2007 was $ 2.92 diluted income per share (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). The Return on Investment (ROI), a critical measurement tool for assessment of efficiency of deployment of assets by the organisation, stood at 19.3% for fiscal 2009 and 19.6% for fiscal 2008. Some of this decrease occurred because of the investment in Chile and the settlement of workers class action lawsuits (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). Free cash flows are net cash flows made available by continuing operations for a period, less the outflows made for purchase of equipment and property during such period, and reflect the capability of organisations to engender additional cash flows from various business segments ; Wal-Marts free cash flows increased from $ 5.7 to 11.6 billion through fiscals 2008 and 2009 respectively (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). A scrutiny of the 5 year financial data reveals that organisational sales increased from $ 281.5 million in fiscal 2005 to $ 401.2 million in fiscal 2009, representing a 42.5% absolute increase (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). A further analysis of the financials reveals that overall net sales realisation per square footage increased by 1.7% from $ 428.2 to $ 435.7 between fiscals 2007 and 2009 respectively (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). It is also important to note that for the Wal-Mart US segment, (which contributed 63.7% of the overall net sales for fiscal 2009), the net sales realisation increased by 3.6% from $ 418.8 to $ 434.0 per square foot between fiscal 2007 and 2009. The average realisation per store in the US increased from $ 65.73 to $ 69.95 million, representing an increase of 6.4% over the same period (Wal-Mart Group, 2010). The above performance analysis of Wal-Marts business segments, vis-à  -vis its strategies, reveals that the group should be able to continue to successfully overcome or sidestep the challenges it must inevitably face in future, considering its worldwide span of operations in 15 diverse global territories. The companys financials reveal that the strength of its balance sheet will continue, barring major risks, to supplement its resources every year in achieving its strategic objectives for the benefit of its stakeholders. Question 5: Wal-Mart forayed into the global marketplace, with the opening of the Sams Club in Mexico, in the 1990s, to revitalise its constrained domestic sales growth; this diversification yielded immense results in terms of growth, in both revenues and earnings, especially after appropriate changes in the companys international strategy were effected in 1999 (Wal-Mart Group, 2007). The company thereafter entered, (in quick succession), Puerto Rico in 1991, Canada in 1994, Brazil and Argentina in 1995, and China in 1996 (Wal-Mart Group, 2007). The subsequent ingress into the UK through the purchase of ASDA, as well as into Japan through Seiyu, furthered its global operations (Wal-Mart Group, 2007). The first part of the companys three-pronged strategy, to unlock the value in their global business, addressed portfolio optimisation in making of correct investments, dissociating from unsuccessful investments, and growing both organically and inorganically (Wal-Mart Group, 2007). The second leg of this international strategy, according to Mitch Slape, Wal-Marts (International Business Development) Vice President, is to leverage global markets to add value through use of all of Wal-Marts resources, competencies, and associations, (Wal-Mart Group, 2007). The year 2007 saw the addition of the third dimension of their strategy, namely, to be triumphant in each of the geographical areas of operation and to have a unique position for eventual generation of value for shareholders. The company, to achieve this, continues to be fixated on the local consumer, relocate know-how, and grow the best international and local talent to enable leveraging the global scale (Wal-Mart Group, 2007). The competition amongst retail companies on the basis of local market power and local scale establishes the branding, cost composition and recall presence for the customer, in all countries; Wal-Mart hurt itself sorely whenever it did not adhere to this principle (Mahajan-Bansal, 2010). With most of the customers, to the first Mexican Wal-Mart store, commuting by buses instead of cars, the companys large Americanised parking-lot was piled up with shopping carts at the end that was closer to the bus stop (Mahajan-Bansal, 2010). The product categories and inventories stacked were attuned to American needs, e.g. golf balls for the lower income level customers (Mahajan-Bansal, 2010). Wal-Mart learnt quickly from these initial and relatively minor errors and bounced back to achieve remarkable success (Mahajan-Bansal, 2010). Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) aver that the organisation must manage itself to realise the synergies of global assimilation and national receptiveness and learn to thrive in the global arena (Fahy, 1996). In terms of wherewithal, such a theory connotes that the organisation should depend not only on the parent organisations resources (global assimilation) or on the resources of the local company (national receptiveness) but must equally highlight both; it must also effectively ensure two-way transfer of learning between both the companies (Fahy, 1996). Although numerous authors assert the pursuit of a global strategy on the foundation of the industrys internationalisation prospects (Porter 1986; Yip, 1989), there is a divergent view that companies need to merge both the local and global dimensions; this combination is occasionally known as localisation (Main, 1989) (Fahy, 1996). Translated, the transnational solution advocates that global business players assimilate the organisational resources and competencies of both the host and the home country (Fahy, 1996). The primary and widely accepted reason for Wal-Marts success in China, as also in the other countries it has forayed into concerns its ability to, over time, acclimatise its operational, merchandising and marketing stratagems to enable their juxtaposition with the host countrys culture. The pursuit of such a transnational, or glocalisation strategy, has led to the company becoming an entrenched transnational retail player. Wal-Mart has successfully implemented its intended stratagems in growing from one international retail store in 1991 to over 3000 stores in 2007 in 13 non-US markets under 50 diverse banners; with almost 600,000 associates or employees offering goods and services to 49 million consumers every week, it has been growing at a compound rate of 24.7% per annum for the last seven years (Wal-Mart Group, 2007). Question 6: Globalisation has ensured enormous wealth creation worldwide over the last two decades. The unprotected and saturated domestic markets of business organisations have forced them to cross their national borders (Stoler, 2006); this global competition has wrought considerable internal and external benefits to businesses and societies across the world. The direct benefit of quantitative growth has profited Wal-Mart in two critical areas, the first being the considerable economies of scale that Wal-Mart has been able to garner from its worldwide buying clout and second, the benefits that have accrued to it from the exchange of ideas across its global operations (Wal-Mart Group, 2007). Wal-Marts volumes have helped it in extracting deeper discounts from all the local businesses of its multinational vendors, like Proctor Gamble, GE and Unilever; who have their own worldwide operations (Wal-Mart Group, 2007). The flow of ideas across geographies also help in the best practices of one country being imbibed in another; a case in point being the layouts of the wine departments in stores in Argentina being replicated into layouts globally (Wal-Mart Group, 2007). Technology has propelled the use of bleeding edge innovations in ensuring efficient inventory and logistics controls. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) product coding and tagging , as an alternative to bar codes, for inventory and security purposes, is already in use by large manufacturers and retailers like Wal-Mart and their worldwide vendors (Stoler, 2006). This translates into immense benefits in terms of supremely efficient global tracking, securing and movement of large volumes of merchandise containers by road, sea and air (Stoler, 2006). Wal-Marts use of its competitively advantageous cross-docking logistics system, by ensuring the movement of these tracked goods between two docking stations within forty eight hours, results in nominal inventories and substantial saving of 2 to 3 percent (Fahy, 1996). In a business where low costs and stretched margins are crucial, this system has generated substantial business values and market dominance (Fahy, 1996). The inimitable local and global synergies of bringing together people, communication systems and modes of transportation give Wal-Mart exceptional competitive advantages (Fahy, 1996). The larger implication of the use of these technologies is in facilitating and promoting, rather than in retarding, international trade through addressing of crucial anti-terrorism and security apprehensions (Stoler, 2006). The extensive use of such technologies also implies that customers will soon be able to verify radio-tagged products, know where, when and by whom they were manufactured, the physical components and chemical procedures used in manufacture, the shipment logistics, the dietetic content and , inter alia, their adherence to sustainable development manufacturing methodologies (Stoler, 2006). Such well informed shoppers should further the cause of superior retail management by buying more merchandise than they are content with (Stoler, 2006). The global commodity chain (GCC) approach of Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994) looks at the worldwide unification, along value and / or commodity chains, concerning consumption, distribution and production of goods (Dolan, 2004). This diagnostic tool is especially valuable in identifying the vital role that conglomerates like Wal-Mart, GAP and Nike play in managing activities in value chains (Dolan, 2004). Gereffi (1994, 1999) underlined the criticality of the so-called buyer-driven commodity chains, and argued that, in certain business sectors, the large marketers, brand-name companies, and retailers, play a central role in instituting and prodding geographically disseminated manufacturing and supplying systems, without their ownership of such systems (Dolan, 2004). The horticultural value chain pertaining to UK-Africa demonstrates numerous properties of a buyer driven commodity chain (Dolan, 2004). The supermarkets oversee the supply arrangements that cover numerous African nations and not only identify the goods but also the manners of production of such merchandise (Dolan and Humphrey, 2004) (Dolan, 2004). Such supermarkets progressively establish the manufacturing imperatives of the upstream horticultural entities and obliquely impact their assumed employment stratagems (Dolan, 2004). This enables significant and direct benefits to Wal-Mart in terms of display of disparate and locally preferred merchandise on its shelves worldwide, thereby helping it to service its customers better. Assignment 2: Individual Reflective Statement Moon (2004) avers that the stages of the reflective cycle, in the widely used Kolb cycle, (Gibbs. 1988), have been variously described by theorists as (a) the experience, (b) identification of the necessity for a resolution of an issue, (c) explanation of the issue, (d) reassessing and remembering, (e) re-evaluating affections / expressive stage, (f) processing of information and thoughts, (g) the ultimate resolution, likely transformation and action and (h) probable action. The Business Synoptic attempts to analyse, with the global retailer Wal-Mart, as the case study, the main issues of the frameworks used to garner competitive advantage in the global marketplace. The exercise helps in comparing the successful, or otherwise, entries into different foreign markets and in assessing the learning thus achieved, understanding the challenges and risks associated with such ventures, identifying the appropriate performance indicators for enabling the analysis of performance of last five years, assessing the results of such analysis vis-à  -vis the adopted strategies, examining the strategies adopted by the company, and finally deciding whether and why such strategies were and are appropriate, and how globalisation has benefited Wal-Mart. This reflective statement study draws greatly on the available literatures that cover the disparate fields of marketing management, strategic management, retail management, international business, and industrial organisation economics, as also the information available on Wal-Mart in the public domain, both on and off line. The analysis involves the use of primary and secondary information available from sources like the Wal-Mart groups website and from books, magazines, journals, the media and newspapers. Whilst the period of reference for this reflective statement commences in the 1960s, when Wal-Mart was founded, the major part of the analytical period spans from the early 1990s when Wal-Mart established its first overseas venture to the five years from 2004 to 2009, for assessment of financial performance indicators. It is also pertinent to note that adequate care has been taken in making sure that the subject matter under examination is pertinent to the issues under this analysis. During the course of this study, I have found that my reflective skills have developed, though I have sometimes skipped certain stages of the reflective cycle and have revisited them later, whilst, in other cases, I have digressed tangentially and have veered away from the current topic of study. This has, over the course of the study, enabled me to delve into the multi-faceted aspects of the diverse factors, as well as the underlying processes and policies that are involved in the management of huge conglomerates. This has also enabled me to better appreciate the humungous logistics behind the everyday retail experiences of millions of shoppers, including the author, who throng the ubiquitous worldwide superstores. During the course of one such digression, I was disheartened to learn that a multinational can also be susceptible for liabilities that can arise out of the non- compliance of its contracted associates with corporate policies on contract labour. The case study revealed the complex relationships that exist between the business environment and the tactical and strategic policies implemented in business segments, as well as the impact and relevance of such policies in staying competitive in the international marketplace. The study also presented the author with the diverse economic, environmental and social criteria that mandated the present and prospective course of action of an organisation for maintenance of its global supremacy in the retail industry. The study of the literature further clarified the importance of social and cultural influences on inter related business decisions and the resultant prosperity, market penetration and growth. The use of both quantitative and qualitative infor

To Save the Earth Essay -- Environment Environmental Ecology Essays

To Save the Earth I wonder how much the front yard of my childhood home is worth. Of course, it's worth less now than before. Once, a stately tree stood in each corner: a tall lilac, a pine, a cherry tree, and a droopy evergreen. My favorite tree lived in the middle. I never knew what kind it was, but every spring it blossomed in delicate pink, and on warm afternoons, I read under its canopy. The front yard no longer looks like that, however. My father removed the lilac bush because it made the lawn too difficult to mow, and cut many of the branches from the pine and my pink-flowered tree so that friends could park their cars on our lawn rather than getting ticketed for parking on the street. Eventually, my tree died from those wounds. But parking place or childhood haunt, what's my yard worth? In The Future of Life, Edward O. Wilson wonders the same about the whole Earth. Wilson, an advisor to various environmental groups and an award winning entomologist, acknowledges that his work requires the preservation of natural habitats, but also clearly feels a deep love for the natural world and a deep sorrow for its destruction. The first half of The Future of Life discusses the ways humans have harmed the environment, culminating with the idea that (like my dad and the yard) we have never been good for the Earth. "The trail of Homo sapiens, serial killer of the biosphere, reaches to the farthest corners of the world." Stopping here, Wilson would make a powerful and persuasive statement, but also a damning and uninspiring one, and the time it takes to impart the lesson dulls its impact. Fortunately, he goes on to explore why this damage is a tragedy, even to an economically minded person like my dad, and how to remedy ou... ...ve large areas of existing ecosystems, particularly rain forests. He argues that NGOs, effective as they have been, cannot save the earth by themselves, and emphasizes the need for greater government involvement. His ideas are firmly grounded in reality, however, and he acknowledges that "...local people with families to feed do not see the larger picture, and their needs cannot be met by a purely preservationist policy." Instead he advocates the economic exploitation of these ecosystems, but in a sustainable and ultimately non-destructive manner. His ideas and goals for the future show a balance necessary in any productive discussion about The Future of Life. If only he could have spoken to my dad about our yard. Works Cited: Wilson, Edward O. The Future of Life. 2002: Alfred A. Knopf, New York. Note: "Overyielding" appears as a single word in the text.

The Torpedoes :: essays research papers

The Torpedoes  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   The pre-war issue torpedo had the disadvantage of leaving a visible trail of bubbles on the surface on its way to the target.  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   The standard torpedo of the war suffered from early problems with its internal depth-keeping equipment, and its firing pistol, but these were solved after the Norwegian Campaign. In mid 1942 an improved version was introduced with an increased battery capacity. The increased battery capacity increased the range 50%. Falke, the first homing torpedo, was fitted with a passive acoustic homing device. It was introduced in March, 1943 and used by U-603,U-758, and U-221 against convoys HX-229 and SC-122. Few were used, as it was replace by the T5, which was faster, had a greater range and could be used with either magnetic or contact detonators. The Zaunkà ¶ning (Gnat) came into service during the autumn of 1943. Intended to be an escort-killer, it achieved some early minor success only to be countered by the allied Foxer noise-making decoy. It was scoring hits against escort and merchants to the end of the war though. The weapon was designed to lock onto the loudest noise after a run of 400m from its launch. This often proved to be the U-boat itself and standard issue-orders were to dive immediately to depth of 60m after launch from a bow tube while a stern shot was to be followed by a complete silence in the boat. Two U-boats were almost certainly lost when hit by one of their own T5 torpedoes, U-972 in Dec 1943 and U-377 in Jan 1944.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Variants All the German U-boat torpedoes were 53.3cm (21 inch) in diameter and had a warhead of 280kg. (The T5 had two important pattern-running devices, which could be applied to various torpedo types.

Love and Disillusionment in Araby and A and P Essay -- Araby James Joy

Love and Disillusionment in â€Å"Araby" by James Joyce and â€Å"A and P" by John Updike â€Å"Araby" by James Joyce and â€Å"A and P " by John Updike are both short stories in which the central characters are in love with women who don’t even know it. The Araby story started sad and ended sadder, however, the â€Å"A and P† story started happy and ended with a heroic act that went unnoticed. The main characters both experience new situations and truths of which they were not previously aware. Both stories will be examined with contemplation according to the type of initiation that took place, the similar and different features of both characters and various elements of the short stories. In the two stories, both characters were experiencing an initiation or awareness of new actualities that were outside of themselves. The main characters both clearly learned that this instigation was beyond their control. It was impossible for them to ignore the new certainty, which they both came to understand. The location in Araby was in Dublin in a quite place â€Å" North Richmond Street, being blind was a quiet street.†(Joyce 728). The young man is poor and lived in an old house. No one took care of this house, so it was in bad condition â€Å"Air, musty from having been long enclosed, hung in all the rooms the waster room behind the kitchen was littered with old useless paper.† (Joyce 728). The garden was growing out of control; books were everywhere, and a priest died in one of the rooms. It was windy a...

Customer Relationship Management and Flight Attendants

Essentials of MIS Additional Cases 1 BUSINESS PROBLEM-SOLVING CASE JetBlue Hits Turbulence In February 2000, JetBlue started flying daily to Fort Lauderdale, Florida and Buffalo, New York, promising top-notch customer service at budget prices. The airline featured new Airbus A320 planes with leather seats, each equipped with a personal TV screen, and average one-way fares of only $99 per passenger. JetBlue was able to provide this relatively luxurious flying experience by using information systems to automate key processes, such as ticket sales (online sales dominate) and baggage handling (electronic tags help track luggage).Jet Blue prided itself on its â€Å"paperless processes. † JetBlue’s investment in information technology enabled the airline to turn a profit by running its business at 70 percent of the cost of larger competitors. At the same time, JetBlue filled a higher percentage of its seats, employed non-union workers, and established enough good will to scor e an impressive customer retention rate of 50 percent. Initially, JetBlue flew only one type of plane from one vendor: the Airbus A320. This approach enabled the airline to standardize flight operations and maintenance procedures to a degree that resulted in considerable savings.CIO Jeff Cohen used the same simple-is-better strategy for JetBlue’s information systems. Cohen depended almost exclusively on Microsoft software products to design JetBlue’s extensive network of information systems. (JetBlue’s reservation system and systems for managing planes, crews, and scheduling are run by an outside contractor. ) Using a single vendor provided a technology framework in which Cohen could keep a small staff and favor in-house development of systems over outsourcing and relying on consultants. The benefit was stable and focused technology spending. JetBlue spent only 1. percent of its revenue on information technology, as opposed to the 5 percent spent by competitors. JetBlue’s technology strategy helped create a pleasing flying experience for passengers. As president and chief operating officer Dave Barger put it, â€Å"Some people say airlines are powered by fuel, but this airline is powered by its IT infrastructure. † JetBlue consistently found itself at the top of J. D. Power and Associates customer satisfaction surveys. JetBlue believed it had learned to work lean and smart. The big question was whether JetBlue would be able to maintain its strategy and its success as the airline grew.By the end of 2006, the company was operating 500 flights daily in 50 cities and had $2. 4 billion in annual revenue. Along the way, JetBlue committed to purchasing a new plane every five weeks through 2007, at a cost of $52 million each. Through all of this, JetBlue remained true to its formula for success and customers continued to return. February 14, 2007, was a wake-up call. A fierce ice storm struck the New York City area that day and set i n motion a string of events that threatened JetBlue’s sterling reputation and its stellar customer relationships.JetBlue made a fateful decision to maintain its schedule in the belief that the horrible weather would break. JetBlue typically avoided pre-canceling flights because passengers usually preferred to have a delayed arrival than to camp out at a terminal or check into a hotel. If the airline had guessed correctly, it would have kept its revenue streams intact and made the customers who were scheduled to fly that day very happy. Most other airlines began canceling flights early in the day, believing it was the prudent decision even though passengers would be inconvenienced and money would be lost.The other airlines were correct. Nine JetBlue planes left their gates at John F. Kennedy International Airport and were stranded on the tarmac for at least six hours. The planes were frozen in place or trapped by iced-over access roads, as was the equipment that would de-ice o r move the aircraft. Passengers were confined inside the planes for up to ten and one-half hours. Supplies of food and water on the planes ran low and toilets in the restrooms began to back up. JetBlue found itself in the middle of a massive dual crisis of customer and public relations.JetBlue waited too long to solicit help for the stranded passengers because the airline figured that the planes would be able to take off eventually. Meanwhile, the weather conditions and the delays or cancellations of other flights caused customers to flood JetBlue’s reservations system, which could not handle the onslaught. At the same time, many of the airline’s pilots and flight crews were also stranded and unable to get to locations where they could pick up the slack for crews that had just worked their maximum hours without rest, but did not actually go anywhere.Moreover, JetBlue did not have a system in place for the rested crews to call in and have their assignments rerouted. The glut of planes and displaced or tired crews forced JetBlue to cancel more flights the next day, a Thursday. And the cancellations continued daily for nearly a week, with the Presidents’ Day holiday week providing few opportunities for rebooking. On the sixth day, JetBlue cancelled 139 of 600 flights involving 11 other airports. 2 76 Part I: Information Systems in Hits Digital Age JetBlue the TurbulenceJetBlue’s eventual recovery was of little solace to passengers who were stranded at the airport for days and missed reservations for family vacations. Overall, more than 1,100 flights were cancelled, and JetBlue lost $30 million. The airline industry is marked by low profit margins and high fixed costs, which means that even short revenue droughts, such as a four-day shutdown, can have devastating consequences for a carrier’s financial stability. Throughout the debacle, JetBlue’s CEO David G. Neeleman was very visible and forthcoming with accountability and apologies.He was quoted many times, saying things such as, â€Å"We love our customers and we’re horrified by this. There’s going to be a lot of apologies. † Neeleman also admitted to the press that JetBlue’s management was not strong enough and its communications system was inadequate. The department responsible for allocating pilots and crews to flights was too small. Some flight attendants were unable to get in touch with anyone who could tell them what to do for three days. With the breakdown in communications, thousands of pilots sand flight attendants were out of position, and the staff could neither find them nor tell them where to go.JetBlue had grown too fast, and its low-cost IT infrastructure and systems could not keep up with the business. JetBlue was accustomed to saving money both from streamlined information systems and lean staffing. Under normal circumstances, the lean staff was sufficient to handle all operations, and the computer syste ms functioned well below their capacity. However, the ice storm exposed the fragility of the infrastructure as tasks such as rebooking passengers, handling baggage, and locating crew members became impossible. Although Neeleman asserted in a conference call hat JetBlue’s computer systems were not to blame for its meltdown, critics of the company pointed out that JetBlue lacked systems to keep track of off-duty flight crews and lost baggage. Its reservation system could not expand enough to meet the high customer call volume. Navitaire, headquartered in Minneapolis, hosts the reservation system for JetBlue as well as for a dozen other discount airlines. The Navitaire system was configured to accomodate up to 650 agents at one time, which was more than sufficient under normal circumstances.During the Valentine’s Day crisis, Navitaire was able to tweak the system to accomodate up to 950 agents simultaneously, but that was still not enough. Moreover, JetBlue could not find enough qualified employees to staff its phones. The company employs about 1,500 reservation agents who work primarily from their homes, linking to its Navitaire Open Skies reservation system using an Internet-based voice communications system. Many ticketholders were unable to determine the status of their flights because the phone lines were jammed.Some callers received a recording that directed them to JetBlue’s Web site. The Web site stopped responding because it could not handle the spike in visitors, leaving many passengers with no way of knowing whether they should make the trip to the airport. JetBlue lacked a computerized system for recording and tracking lost bags. It did have a system for storing information such as the number of bags checked in by a passenger and bag tag identification numbers. But the system could not record which bags had not been picked up or their location.There was no way for a JetBlue agent to use a computer to see if a lost bag for a partic ular passenger was among the heap of unclaimed bags at airports where JetBlue was stranded. In the past, JetBlue management did not feel there was a need for such a system because airport personnel were able to look up passenger records and figure out who owned leftover bags. When so many flights were canceled, the process became unmanageable. JetBlue uses several applications provided by outsourcing vendor Sabre Airline Solutions of Southlake, Texas to manage, schedule, and track planes and crews and to develop actual flight plans.Sabre’s FliteTrac application interfaces with the Navitaire reservation system to provide managers with information about flight status, fuel, passenger lists, and arrival times. Sabre’s CrewTrac application tracks crew assignments and provides pilots and flight attendants access to their schedules via a secure Web portal. JetBlue uses a Navitaire application called SkySolver to determine how to redeploy planes and crews to emerge from fligh t disruptions. However, JetBlue found out during the Valentine’s Day emergency that SkySolver was unable to transfer the information quickly to JetBlue’s Sabre applications.And even if these systems had worked properly together, JetBlue would have probably been unable to locate all of its flight crews to redirect them. It did not have a system to keep track of off-duty crew members. Overtaxed phone lines prevented crew members from calling into headquarters to give their locations and availability for work. JetBlue’s response to its humiliating experience was multifaceted. On the technology front, the airline deployed new software that sends recorded messages to pilots and flight attendants to inquire about their availability.When the employees return the calls, the information they supply is entered into a system that stores the data for access and analysis. From a staffing standpoint, Neeleman promised to train 100 employees from the airline’s corporate office to serve as backups for the departments that were stretched too thin by the effects of the storm. Chapter 2:of MIS AdditionalBusinesses Use Information Systems Essentials E-Business: How Cases 77 3 JetBlue attempted to address its customer relations and image problems by creating a customer bill of rights to enforce standards for customer treatment and airline behavior.JetBlue would be penalized when it failed to provide proper service, and customers who were subjected to poor service would be rewarded. JetBlue set the maximum time for holding passengers on a delayed plane at five hours. The company changed its operational philosophy to make more accomodation for inclement weather. An opportunity to test its changes arrived for JetBlue just one month after the incident that spurred the changes. Faced with another snow and ice storm in the northeast United States on March 16, 2007, JetBlue cancelled 215 flights, or about a third of its total daily slate.By canceling early, ma nagement hoped to ensure that its flight crews would be accessible and available when needed, and that airport gates would be kept clear in case flights that were already airborne had to return. In the wake of its winter struggles, JetBlue was left to hope that its customers would be forgiving and that its losses could be offset. Neeleman pointed out that only about 10,000 of JetBlue’s 30 million annual customers were inconvenienced by the airline’s weather-related breakdowns.On May 10, 2007, JetBlue’s Board of Directors removed Neeleman as CEO, placing him in the role of non-executive chairman. According to Liz Roche, managing partner at Customers Incorporated, a customer relationship management research and consulting firm, â€Å"JetBlue demonstrated that it’s an adolescent in the airline industry and that it has a lot of learning and growing up to do. † Sources: Doug Bartholomew and Mel Duvall, â€Å"What Really Happened at JetBlue,† Base line Magazine, April 1, 2007; â€Å"JetBlue Cancels Hundreds of Flights,† The Associated Press, accessed via www. nytimes. om, March 16, 2007; Susan Carey and Darren Everson, â€Å"Lessons on the Fly: JetBlue’s New Tactics,† The Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2007; Eric Chabrow, â€Å"JetBlue’s Management Meltdown,† CIO Insight, February 20, 2007; Jeff Bailey, â€Å"Chief ‘Mortified’ by JetBlue Crisis,† The New York Times, February 19, 2007 and â€Å"Long Delays Hurt Image of JetBlue,† The New York Times, February 17, 2007; Susan Carey and Paula Prada, â€Å"Course Change: Why JetBlue Shuffled Top Rank,† The Wall Street Journal, May 11, 2007; Coreen Bailor, JetBlue’s Service Flies South,† Customer Relationship Management, May 2007; Thomas Hoffman, â€Å"Out-of-the-Box Airline Carries Over Offbeat Approach to IT,† Computerworld, March 11, 2003; and Stephanie Overby, â€Å"JetBlue Skies Ahead, † CIO Magazine, July 1, 2002. Case Study Questions 1. What types of information systems and business functions are described in this case? 2. What is JetBlue’s business model? How do its information systems support this business model? 3.What was the problem experienced by JetBlue in this case? What people, organization, and technology factors were responsible for the problem? 4. Evaluate JetBlue’s response to the crisis. What solutions did the airline come up with? How were these solutions implemented? Do you think that JetBlue found the correct solutions and implemented them correctly? What other solutions can you think of that JetBlue hasn’t tried? 5. How well is JetBlue prepared for the future? Are the problems described in this case likely to be repeated? Which of JetBlue’s business processes are most vulnerable to breakdowns? How much will a customer bill of rights help?